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Power in a Pandemic: Teachers’ Unions and Their Responses to School
Reopening
Bradley D. Marianno
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Annie A. Hemphill
Michigan State University
Ana Paula S. Loures-Elias
Libna Garcia
Deanna Cooper
Emily Coombes
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Drawing on Bachrach and Baratz’s first and second faces of interest group power, we explore the relationship between teachers’ union power and reopening decisions during the fall 2020 semester in 250 large districts around the United States. We
leverage a self-collected panel data set of reopening decisions coupled with measures of teachers’ union first face power
(drawn from social media postings on teachers’ unions’ Facebook pages) and second face power (operationalized as district
size, whether the school district negotiates a collective bargaining agreement with the teachers’ union, the length of the collective bargaining agreement, and the amount of revenue raised by the union). We found that school districts where teachers’
unions exhibit strong second face power (but not first face power) were less likely to start the school year with in-person
instruction, were less likely to ever open during fall semester with in-person instruction and spent fewer weeks in in-person
learning.
Keywords: teachers’ unions, COVID-19, education policy, education politics

The COVID-19 pandemic has stretched education governance systems as state, district, and school leaders strive to
set forth new expectations for schooling in the midst of an
unprecedented crisis. At the start of the 2020–2021 school
year, many state and local decision makers, including state
boards of education and local school boards, proposed
school reopening plans that provided some in-person instruction with the hope of alleviating the stresses of virtual school
on students and parents (Goldstein & Shapiro, 2020). As
education leaders announced their plans to return students to
classrooms, some teachers and teachers’ unions pushed
back, often citing fears for their own or their students’ safety
(Goldstein & Shapiro, 2020; Will, 2020). These acts of resistance took on different forms in the late summer and early
fall of 2020. For example, the United Federation of Teachers
organized a protest against New York’s plan to return to inperson instruction (Rosner & Lapin, 2020; Will, 2020).
Other unions filed lawsuits, including the Orange County
Classroom Teachers Association who claimed the district
refused to negotiate details of their reopening plan (Postal,

2020). Even after the 2020–2021 school year officially
started, many districts’ plans were still under negotiation
with local teachers’ unions. For example, the Chicago
Teachers Union continued to negotiate the terms of the district’s plan well into February 2021.
The dynamic nature of the COVID-19 infection rates
coupled with the localized nature of reopening decisions (vs.
state or federal reopening mandates) set the stage for an
ever-evolving school reopening situation throughout fall
2020. Prior papers establish the relationship between teachers’ unions’ strength and initial fall 2020 district reopening
decisions (DeAngelis & Makridis, 2021; Grossmann et al.,
2021; Harris et al., 2021; Hartney & Finger, 2021). For
example, Hartney and Finger (2021) examined the relationship between political and market factors and reopening decisions at the beginning of fall semester. They found
that the political factors, including county partisanship and
teachers’ union strength, more so than the changes in
COVID-19 infection rates or the accessibility of private
school options, were the strongest predictors of reopening

Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use,
reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open
Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

Marianno et al.

for in-person instruction at the start of the fall semester.
DeAngelis and Makridis (2021) showed similar results.
However, both papers utilized indirect measures of teachers’
union strength—Hartney and Finger (2021) proxied for
union strength with district size, and DeAngelis and Makridis
(2021) utilized professional worker unionization rates that
were not specific to teachers’ unions. Harris et al. (2021)
defined union power based on the share of school districts
with different collective bargaining statuses (no bargaining
agreement, meet-and-confer agreement, and collective bargaining agreement [CBA]). They found that fewer schools
started the fall 2020 semester with in-person instruction in
counties with a larger share of districts operating under
CBAs. Grossmann et al. (2021) utilized a measure of CBA
restrictiveness from Michigan and found that restrictiveness
coupled with political partisanship were associated with the
increased likelihood that Michigan school districts started
the year in remote learning.
In this article, we expand on these findings in a few ways.
First, existing research has focused primarily on the initial
reopening decisions at the beginning of the fall 2020 semester. Yet, teachers’ unions likely sought to shape not only
instructional decisions at the start of the school year but also
those decisions that occurred later on. Consequently, we concentrated not only on initial reopening decisions in fall 2020
but also tracked decisions throughout the duration of the fall
semester. Second, we employed more nuanced theoreticalbased measures of union strength than prior work based on
the first and second faces of interest group power (Bachrach
& Baratz, 1962). A group’s first face power is reactive and
comes from their ability to forcefully argue their position and
win policy disagreements. Second face power is more proactive in nature compared with first face power and comes from
a group’s position to set the policy agenda and anticipate the
support of policy makers (Finger, 2019). By employing measures for both faces of power, we explore not only whether
teachers’ union power is associated with reopening decisions
but also how (i.e., whether the proactive [second face] and/or
reactive [first face] actions of teachers’ unions are related to
policy decisions). Specifically, in this study we asked, what is
the relationship between teachers’ unions’ first and second
face power and school district reopening decisions during the
fall 2020 semester? We note that we are neutral on whether
schools should open for in-person instruction during the
COVID pandemic and instead focus on explaining factors
related to reopening decisions.
To answer this question, we assembled a novel database
that tracked the reopening decisions of 250 districts throughout the United States, including the five largest districts in
every state based on student enrollment. We measured local
teachers’ union second face power by capturing (1) the size
of the district, (2) whether the school district negotiates a
CBA with a teachers’ union, (3) the length of the CBA,
and (4) the amount of revenue the local union generates
2

annually. We captured first face power by measuring the
efforts the union engaged in to try to influence reopening
plans as detailed through a content analysis of union
Facebook pages. We ran several regression models to analyze the relationship between these different measures of
union power and districts’ reopening decisions throughout
the fall 2020 semester.
Previous Literature on Teachers’ Unions’ Political
Influence
Scholars and policy makers have repeatedly ranked
teachers’ unions as one of the most influential groups in
education (Moe, 2005; Thomas & Hrebenar, 1999, 2004).
Teachers’ unions aim to represent the interests of their
members and are able to advocate for teacher policy preferences in a couple of ways (Moe, 2006; Thomas & Hrebenar,
2004). First, teachers’ unions negotiate CBAs with school
district administrators. Forty-four states permit collective
bargaining, and these contract negotiations provide a venue
for teachers’ unions to exert considerable influence on a
variety of local education policy decisions (Marianno et al.,
2021; Moe, 2009; Strunk & Grissom, 2010). CBAs can
cover a broad range of issues from the allocation of district
funds to the basic day-to-day duties of teachers (Ballou,
2000; Strunk et al., 2018). Researchers have found that districts with strong teachers’ unions offer teachers higher salaries, smaller class sizes, and longer planning periods—all
policies that are negotiated into CBAs (e.g., Hoxby, 1996;
Rose & Sonstelie, 2010; Strunk, 2011).
In addition, teachers’ unions can influence education
policy decisions through direct lobbying of lawmakers and
contributions to election campaigns (Marianno, 2020; Moe,
2011). Finger (2018) found that teachers’ union power, as
operationalized by teachers’ union membership rates, was
associated with a lower probability of states enacting performance pay policies. Other studies show that teachers’
union power was associated with narrower sets of charter
school policies (Shober et al., 2006) but not the prevention
of new reforms under No Child Left Behind (Shelly, 2008).
Marianno (2020) showed that legislatures in states where
teachers’ unions expend more campaign resources relative
to opposing groups enact more favorable state-level teacher
policies.
This study takes another look at teachers’ unions’ policy
influence, this time investigating school district reopening
decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic. While school
reopening decisions are not directly in the purview of collective bargaining negotiations, they are also not wholly independent. Many of the changes proposed in the reopening and
closure of schools required changes to teacher working conditions thereby placing teachers’ unions in a position to
influence school reopening through bargaining negotiations
(Hemphill & Marianno, 2021). And even when school
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reopening plans did not impact a negotiated agreement,
teachers’ unions still had a vested interest in shaping reopening plans, as already mentioned. Because school reopening
decisions were largely left to local school boards and district
administrators versus state executives or policy makers
(Grossmann et al., 2021), this placed teachers’ unions in a
prime position to utilize their power to shape whether and
how schools reopened.
Theoretical Framework: Teachers’ Unions and the Two
Faces of Power
Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) conceptualization of first
and second face power expounded on Dahl’s (1957) argument that “A has power of B meaning that A’s behavior regularly causes B to do something that B would not otherwise
do” (pp. 202–203). The theory of first and second face power
puts forward the idea that political actors outwardly participate in policy decision-making processes to try to influence
policy proposals and outcomes and do so through two main
mechanisms—one that is more proactive in nature and one
that is more reactive in nature. The second face of power is
proactive and is accomplished when an interest group is
powerful enough to establish allies that put forward policy
proposals that represent the interest group’s main priorities
without requiring a forceful response from the interest
group. This generally occurs as policy makers perform the
calculus that a group is so influential that cooperating with
the group and adopting the group’s favored ideas is in their
best interest. Once responsive to the interest group’s position, these allies align their political values with those of the
interest group, and thus effectively do the bidding of the
interest group when determining which policies to put forward and which policies to enact. The result is a policy
agenda that ignores proposals that are contrary to the interest
group’s position and favors those that are in alignment
(Baumgartner et al., 2009).
Sometimes a group’s second face power is not sufficient to
control the policy agenda and unfavorable policy proposals
are put forward that run contrary to the interest group’s position. In these situations, an interest group may seek to exercise
their first face of power. The first face of power includes reactive measures to policy proposals once those policies are on
the agenda. In the case of interest groups, these may include
work stoppages like strikes or sickouts, protests, litigation,
forceful public statements, and information campaigns. In
short, if an interest group does not have access to second face
power mechanisms, they can use strategies that rely on first
face power to try to influence policy decisions.
Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) two faces of power theory
has been referred to often in political science literature, but
it has been primarily used in theoretical pieces about group
power and less often in empirical studies (Dowding, 2011).
It has been called on to explain policy processes in public

sectors including affordable housing, human rights, sustainability, and education. Zaaiman and Mupambwa (2021) used
the faces of power framework to demonstrate the multidimensional nature of power between various stakeholders
(i.e., regional planning group, local politicians, community
members, and housing contractors) that contributed to the
stalling of the affordable housing initiative in Khutsong,
South Africa. Additionally, Arts (2003) demonstrated how
the first face of power was utilized by the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN) to influence the Convention of Biological Diversity.
The theoretical framework has also been applied to a
sample of education policy studies. Maxcy (2011) used the
framework to explain the emergence of performance
accountability policies in the late 2000s. Maxcy noted that
after the accountability policies were enacted, teachers had
more first face power because they often had more flexibility in the curriculum they used, but the administrators and
district had increased second face power because they set the
priorities and the goals for the district that the teachers were
required to meet. Finger (2019) analyzed the impact of first
and second face teachers’ union power on education policy
outcomes. She found that second face power (union membership rates), was related to policy passage and proposal
rates, whereas measures of first face power (campaign contributions) were not.
The dearth of empirical applications of Bachrach and
Baratz’s (1962) theory presents a new opportunity here to
leverage school reopening decisions during the pandemic to
understand how interest group power is associated with policymaking. Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) argued that policy
actors can draw on multiple methods to influence policy, and
researchers can overlook a groups’ influence if they only
examine one method. Therefore, it is important to capture
both the first and second face power mechanisms as they
relate to policy outcomes.
Teachers’ Unions and the First and Second Faces of
Power
Due to the local nature of COVID-19 school reopening
plans, we argue that teachers’ unions’ second face power
partly resides in their opportunity to negotiate CBAs with
school district management. When members from the teachers’ union have a seat at the bargaining table, they have a
voice in policies that affect working requirements for their
teacher membership, and thus the opportunity to proactively shape a school district’s policy agenda. Because
CBAs dictate almost all aspects related to teachers’ responsibilities including professional development requirements,
required work hours and breaks, classroom assignments,
and evaluations, unions policy influence can be quite expansive (Ballou, 2000; Goldschmidt & Stuart, 1986; Marianno
et al., 2021; Moe, 2009; Strunk & Reardon, 2010). Once
3

Marianno et al.

negotiated, CBAs go before the school board for final ratification. Not surprisingly, teachers’ unions also exert second
face power here because they actively campaign for district
school board members by encouraging their members to get
out and vote in school board elections, contributing campaign
funds to candidates, and distributing informational materials
in school board elections to recruit allies that will sit on the
other side of their collective bargaining negotiation table
(Moe, 2006). Strunk and Grissom (2010) found that district’s
with more powerful teachers’ unions (as perceived by school
board members) negotiated more restrictive contracts, where
restrictiveness was defined as the degree to which a given
contract places boundaries on the flexibility of administrators
to determine teacher working conditions. Prior research suggests contracts change only marginally over time and take
some time to build in strength (e.g., Cowen & Fowles, 2013;
Ingle & Wisman, 2018)—thus, the strength of these agreements likely reflect long-standing relationships between
teachers’ unions and school districts.
Nevertheless, while the local nature of school reopening
decisions in reaction to COVID-19 placed the decisions in a
realm where teachers’ unions could leverage their longstanding relationships to have second face power, the dynamic
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic may have presented
some challenges in using these relationships. In particular,
the unprecedented nature of a once-in-a-century global pandemic and the changing nature of the federal and state pandemic responses created some uncertainty around school
reopening decisions. As traditional school board meetings
were disrupted and moved virtual, face-to-face communication channels had to change. Directives from federal and
state leaders sometimes changed with little warning, making
it more difficult for unions to anticipate policy responses. In
short, unions may have needed to revert to strategies that
called upon their first face power to argue their policy position and pushed back on district actions that ran contrary to
their interests. The first face power methods that unions
employed in the summer and fall of 2020 included protests,
broadcasting official statements from union leadership, conducting member surveys, and filing lawsuits to push back
against unfavorable reopening plans. Gathering survey data
from union members about their opinions regarding remote
school and broadcasting those results helps unions define
their policy position and present evidence showing how
many of their members either agree or disagree with the current policy decision. Strategies such as public protests and
official policy statements illustrate a group’s first face power
because they are actions where the union presents their own
policy position and where they seek to gain support to ultimately win a policy battle. Lawsuits offer a more extreme
example of the teacher’s union trying to reverse policies.
Unions that did not have collective bargaining laws or strong
second face power may have also engaged in these first face
power strategies if they knew they could not rely on school
board allies to represent their interests.
4

The unique circumstances surrounding COVID-19
reopening plans present an opportunity to unpack the type of
power unions rely on when they attempt to shape education
policy. The suddenness and novelty of the crisis puts teachers’ unions’ second face power to the test to see if their allies
know their interests and adequately represent them, or if
these connections become unreliable and force unions to
rely on first face power methods by mobilizing their members to block undesirable policy proposals.
Data
We combined several sources of data to capture the relationship between first and second face teachers’ union power
and school reopening decisions throughout the fall 2020
semester.
In order to understand the potential impact of mobilization efforts on reopening decisions, we chose to limit our
sample to 250 school districts representing 48% of the total
number of students enrolled in public schools across the
United States. We created the sample by selecting the five
largest districts in each state based on student enrollment.
Because Hawaii operates as a single district and because we
included Washington, D.C., this brought our total number of
districts to 247. We subsequently added the next largest districts in any state, which added districts from California,
Florida, and Texas to reach our total of 250 school districts.
Our sample has a few key advantages. Because we
selected multiple districts from each state, we can make
between-district comparisons on a national scale.
Additionally, by including the most populated districts in
each state, we can study reopening decisions in urban districts that regionally experienced relatively high concentrations of COVID-19 cases. These districts should be the ones
most responsive to the severity of the pandemic. Finally,
urban districts are typically characterized as having the
strongest CBAs and most active teachers’ unions (Marianno
et al., 2018; Olin, 2020; Winkler et al., 2012). Thus, we are
not only studying reopening in locations where the pandemic
was more severe but also where teachers’ unions are more
active. This also means that the union strength measures are
easier to construct. Large districts are more likely to maintain updated websites with information on their school
reopening plans and their current CBAs. Large unions are
more likely to keep active Facebook pages and file IRS 990
tax forms on their annual revenue. While this sample has its
strengths, it also has a limitation. Our findings are not generalizable to all districts in the United States, just the largest
with the most active unions and the highest pandemic
severity.
Measures of Second Face Power
Second face power measures should capture the strength
of a group’s position to set the policy agenda and anticipate
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the support of policy makers. We utilized four measures of
second face power.
District Size. Prior research finds that larger school districts
have stronger teachers’ unions (e.g., Rose & Sonstelie,
2010). Larger districts employ more teachers (i.e., more
potential union members) that make unionization easier to
accomplish. With large membership bases, unions have significant influence over the supply of teacher labor to school
districts and with that influence can exert more pressure on
school districts to align their policy interests with those of
the union. Additionally, unions with large membership represent a significant voting block to influence the outcomes
of school board elections, and thus put in place allies who
would ratify their CBAs. Because measures of local union
membership are difficult to come by, we measured district
size by the number of students in the school district (natural
logged for inclusion in the models).
Collective Bargaining Agreement. One of our measures of
second face power is a dichotomous indicator for whether
the school district has a CBA. Collective bargaining creates
a direct channel for teachers’ unions to influence reopening
plans as many of the working condition changes required by
the movement from in-person to remote instruction or from
remote back to in-person instruction are required to be negotiated with teachers’ unions (Hemphill & Marianno, 2021).
Collective bargaining gives teachers’ unions a legal voice in
policies that affect working requirements for their teacher
membership, and thus the opportunity to proactively shape a
school district’s policy agenda.
In our 250-district sample, we located the CBA for all
160 districts in states that require administrators engage in
collective bargaining with employee groups. We also procured CBAs for 24 of the 40 districts in states that permit
administrators and employee groups to engage in collective
bargaining but do not require it. For the remaining 16 districts in this group, we verified that teachers in these districts
were not covered by a CBA (by contacting the district
directly and through media sources). Consequently, the 187
districts for which we have a CBA represent the totality of
the districts in our sample of 250 that have an active CBA.
Collective Bargaining Agreement Length. Our third measure of second face power is more specific to school districts
with a CBA and is operationalized as the page length of
CBA. We use the length of the CBA as a proxy for a more
formal measure of CBA restrictiveness, a common measure
of teachers’ union strength in the research literature, and one
that captures the degree to which contracts favorably represent teachers’ interests (e.g., Grossmann et al., 2021; Marianno & Strunk, 2018; Strunk & Reardon, 2010). Generating
a formal measure of CBA restrictiveness is labor intensive as
it involves the detailed content analysis of the agreements
(Strunk & Reardon, 2010); however, past work on the

measure shows that the length of the agreement is positively
and moderately correlated with restrictiveness at 0.43 (p <
.001) (Marianno & Strunk, 2018). We note that page length
is not a perfect proxy for restrictiveness as both school districts and teachers’ unions are interested in placing language
in the CBA that would extend the length of the agreement
but not necessarily change its overall restrictiveness. However, if we assume that school district administrators prefer
the flexibility to define and change teacher working conditions, then extending the length of an agreement by adding
in additional language is likely not the preferred condition
for district administrators. When district leaders secure language in the contract, a more permanent policy condition is
created such that any future changes must now be negotiated
with the union. The mandate to negotiate does not exist if an
agreement is silent on an issue. Thus, even when district
administrators add language to the contract, it may be in
reaction to or anticipation of a union striving to define policy
on a given bargaining issue. Therefore, we consider CBA
page length a suitable, albeit imperfect proxy for CBA
restrictiveness. We obtained the district CBAs through The
National Council on Teacher Quality (2019) website, the
local unions websites, and the local districts websites.
Union Revenue. Stronger unions are also able to generate
more revenue through membership dues for union operations (Lott & Kenny, 2013). They can subsequently spend
this money to create larger staff and fund membership outreach efforts to grow their ability to represent teachers’
interests. We generated information on union revenue from
IRS 990 tax filings. Unions, as nonprofit organizations, are
required to file an annual information return that details their
annual revenue. If the organization brings in $50,000 or less,
they can file a shortened form (e-postcard) that does not
include the revenue information. In our sample, we obtained
the IRS 990 tax forms for 215 of the 250 districts. The
remaining 35 organizations had not filed an IRS 990 form
for a number of years and some even had their tax-exempt
status revoked. Of the 215 districts for which we located an
IRS 990 tax form, 35 made $50,000 or less. In order to retain
these unions in the model, we divided the union revenue
measure into quintiles with those unions that made $50,000
or less serving as the reference category (and thus, we did
not need to assume the exact amount of revenue these unions
brought in). Unions in the top quintile brought in between
$1,888,000 and $200,000,000. Unions in the second quintile
brought in between $580,900 and $1,888,000. Unions in the
third quintile brought in between $181,000 and $580,900.
Unions in the fourth quintile brought in more than $50,000
and less than $181,000.
Measure of First Face Power
To measure teachers’ unions’ first face power, we assembled a database of Facebook posts spanning the months
5
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before and after school reopening decisions. We initially
captured teachers’ unions’ Facebook and Twitter posts for
this analysis but found that they repeated their posts across
platforms. Therefore, we decided to only code the Facebook
posts because that is the platform that the majority of teachers’ unions utilized. We archived all Facebook pages from
July 1 through December 18 to capture the entire fall 2020
semester and at least a month before any school district in
our sample opened.
Berry (1977) outlined four first face power strategies that
interest groups utilize to influence a particular situation. The
first, and most forceful, is litigation. We scored litigation
posts, or those that reflected union-initiated lawsuits regarding COVID-19 protocols and reopening plans, with a value
of three. We combined the next two strategies—confrontation and mobilization. Here we coded posts that mentioned
scheduled union protests and official public statements from
union leadership that came out against a COVID-19 reopening proposal or protocol. These posts were scored with a
value of two. Finally, groups can engage in informational
strategies where they release research reports or information
about group members’ opinions to add legitimacy to their
claims. We coded information posts as those that included
surveys of union membership about members’ opinions
regarding fall 2020 school reopening. These were scored
with a value of one. From this scoring, we created a continuous first face power measure that is a summation of a union’s
weekly posting score that ranges from 0 (if they had no
posts) and 8 (if they had all of the posts). Examples of each
of the four types of posts are displayed in Figure 1.
District Reopening Status
We also assembled our own database on the reopening
status of our 250 districts each week during fall semester. We
found that accurate information on school district reopening
status over the course of fall semester was hard to come by
from existing large databases of reopening decisions (like
the MCH Strategic Data) for most of the districts in our sample. Consequently, we verified the reopening status of each
school district in our sample for each week during the fall
semester (August 1 to December 18) by searching media
reports, school district websites, and school district social
media pages for information on school reopening. Because
the largest districts in each state are more likely to be covered in media reports or to have readily accessible web
pages, we had little trouble verifying districts’ weekly
reopening status using this search method. Because many
districts reopened schools in phases—often by grade-level—
we defined reopening status based on the school option
available to first graders in the district. We did this because
younger students were often the first to return to in-person
schooling. We defined a district’s reopening status as
“remote” if first graders learned solely through remote
6

means or “in-person” if first graders spent at least some time
in-person during the 5-day week. The hybrid and full inperson instruction categories were collapsed (as done in
prior research; Grossmann et al., 2021) due to the small
number of districts running hybrid and fully in-person
instruction at the start of the school year (54 and 55 districts,
respectively).
District Characteristics
Following prior research, we controlled for other key
characteristics of districts that may make them more or less
likely to reopen (DeAngelis & Makridis 2021; Grossmann
et al., 2021; Harris et al., 2021; Hartney & Finger, 2021).
First, we controlled for political partisanship as measured by
the share of Trump voters in the school district’s county during the 2016 presidential election.1 We derived these data
from the MIT Election Data Science Lab. We accounted for
pandemic severity by employing a countywide measure of
the 7-day average of COVID-19 hospitalizations per 100,000
residents as collected by the National Center for Research on
Education Access and Choice (REACH). We believe the
hospitalization rate is a better measure than some other indicators of pandemic severity because it is not reliant on testing availability.2 We used data from the National Center for
Education Statistics to create measures of the percentage of
free and reduced-price lunch students, the percentage of
Black students, the percentage of Hispanic students, the
number of charter schools per 10,000 students, urbanicity
(urban or suburban vs. rural), and total per pupil expenditures (natural logged for inclusion in the models). Table 1
contains the descriptive statistics for all outcome and independent variables and Supplemental Appendix Table 1
(available in the online version of this article) shows the
bivariate correlations.
Analysis
Table 2 shows our research question and the analytic
methods employed to answer the research question. Ideally,
we would be able to randomly assign teachers’ unions to
school districts and observe how union power influences the
probability of reopening in a hybrid or in-person model relative to remote. Given that this experiment is not feasible, and
in an effort to isolate the impact of teachers’ unions on
reopening, we try to control for specific differences between
districts that might make school reopening more or less
likely.
Logistic Regression Models Predicting Probability of InPerson Instruction at the Beginning of Fall Semester
We started with a series of logistic regression models,
where we defined Pds as the probability that a district starts

Figure 1. Examples of first face power in teachers’ unions’ social media posts.

the school year open for first-grade students (we also show a
series of models predicting the probability that a district
starts remotely for first-grade students). The model estimated the log odds of the probability of an in-person start
relative to a remote start as a function of school district characteristics defined by Xds, where (d) indexes districts and (s)
indexes states. The full equation was specified as follows:

 Pds 
log 
 = β0 + β1 X ds + β2 secondfaceds
 1 − Pds 
+ β3 firstfaceds + ds

(1)

The district characteristics included partisan politics (the
share of Trump votes in the school district’s county during
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Outcomes/variables

M or %

Outcomes
% Remote (beginning of school year)
% In-person (beginning of school year)
% Ever open in-person
% Never open in-person
No. of weeks open for in-person
Second face power
District size (ln)
Has CBA
CBA length (in pages)
Union revenue Q5 (≤50,000)
Union revenue Q4 (50,000–181,000)
Union revenue Q3 (181,000–581,000)
Union revenue Q2 (581,000–1.8 million)
Union revenue Q1 (1.8 million–200 million)
First face power
First face power social media posts (beginning of school year)
First face power social media posts (during fall)
Control variables
Share of Trump votes in county (partisanship)
New COVID hospitalizations per 100,000 (weekly average)
New COVID hospitalizations per 100,000 (weekly average, max)
% FRL
% Black students
% Hispanic student
Charter schools per 10,000 students
Urban
Suburban
Total per pupil expenditures (ln)

56
44
71
29
9.000
10.218
75%
87.871
20%
20%
20%
20%
20%

SD

6.876
1.064
67.453

Min

Max

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
20

7.340
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

13.778
1
426.000
1
1
1
1
1

0.768
1.280

1.484
1.878

0
0

43.380
37.685
101.860
49.516
20.211
23.142
0.558
58%
29%
9.576

14.572
57.614
83.896
25.063
20.132
19.902
1.268

4.087
0

86.697
500.000

0
0.049
0.370
0
0
0
8.890

100.000
89.654
96.420
7.964
1
1
10.588

0.311

7.000
8.000

Note. CBA = collective bargaining agreement; FRL = free and reduced-price lunch.

Table 2
Research Question and Associated Analytic Methods
Research question
What is the relationship
between teachers’ unions’
first and second face
power and school district
reopening decisions during
the fall 2020 semester
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Analytic strategy
Open beginning of fall semester: We used a series of logistic regression models that estimated the
relationship between first and second face power and the probability that a district started the
school year in in-person instruction and in remote instruction.
Ever open during fall semester: We then modified these logistic regression models and estimated
the relationship between first and second face power and the probability that a district ever held
in-person instruction and never held in-person instruction during fall semester.
Number of weeks open during fall semester: We utilized a series of Poisson regression models
that estimated the relationship between first and second face power and the count of weeks in inperson instruction during fall semester.
Time to first open fall semester: We estimated a series of Cox proportional hazard models that
assessed the relationship between first and second face power and the time to first reopening for
in-person instruction.
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the 2016 presidential election), pandemic severity (the natural log of new COVID hospitalizations per 100,000 residents
in the school district’s county), the percentage of free and
reduced-price lunch students, the percentage of Black students, the percentage of Hispanic students, charter school
competition (the number of charter schools per 10,000 students in the district), urban or suburban location (vs. rural),
and total per pupil expenditures (natural log).
Our key independent variables of interest included our
four measures of second face teachers’ union power (which
we entered separately in individual models) and first face
teachers’ union power.3 Our results are presented as odds
ratios. We clustered the standard errors at the state level to
account for the fact that our data included multiple districts
per state that likely shared some characteristics.
Logistic Regression Models Predicting Probability of InPerson Instruction During Fall Semester
In a divergence from prior research on the topic
(DeAngelis & Makridis, 2021; Grossmann et al., 2021;
Harris et al., 2021; Hartney & Finger, 2021), we explored a
few additional questions about the relationship between
teachers’ unions’ power and reopening decisions beyond
the start of the fall semester. This is important because
teachers’ unions may not only influence reopening decisions at the beginning of the school year but also the ongoing assessment of instructional delivery mode, including
when or whether a district that began the school year
remote eventually returns students to the classroom and
whether a district returns to remote instruction after initiating a full or partial reopening. First, we explored whether
teachers’ unions’ first and second face power was related to
whether a school district ever opened/never opened in inperson during fall semester. We assessed this by modifying
Equation (1) to predict the probability that a district ever
opened and never opened for in-person instruction during
the fall semester.
Poisson Regression Models Predicting the Number of
Weeks of In-Person Instruction
We also explored whether teachers’ unions first and second face power related to the total number of weeks a school
district is open in remote learning. To account for the fact
these outcome variables were nonnegative integer counts
that did not follow a normal distribution, we employed a
Poisson regression model. The Poisson regression models
estimated the probability of an event y (i.e., weeks in remote
instruction),
 eu µ y 
Pr(Y = y | µ) = 
 ( y = 0,1, 2,...).
 y! 

µ was the mean incidence rate per unit of exposure, where
exposure in our study was defined as the number of possible
weeks a school district could be open during fall semester
(which was a maximum of 20 weeks in our data for a district
that started school by the first week of August). Our model
predicted incidence rate µds as a function of the key district
characteristics mentioned above, where (d) again indexes
districts and (s) indexes states:
µ ds = exp(β 0 + β1X + β2 secondfaceds + β3 firstface +  )
ds

ds

ds

ds

(2)

We presented the results as incidence rate ratios. The Poisson
model has the restrictive assumption that the mean incidence
rate is equal to the variance of the incidence rate, which was
violated in the case of our study. The violation of the assumption does not affect the estimated coefficients but instead affects
the standard errors. However, employing robust standard errors
relaxes this assumption. With robust standard errors, the
Poisson regression typically performs better than the negative
binomial estimator (which is also robust to variance assumptions) when utilizing fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2010).
Cox Proportional Hazard Models Predicting the Time to
In-Person Instruction
Our final model leveraged the weekly time-series nature of
our data by estimating the relationship between union power
and the time to first in-person opening. We utilized a series of
Cox proportional hazards models of the following form:
λ dst (t | covariatesdst ) = λ 0 (t ) exp (β0 + β1X dst
+ β2 secondfacedst + β3 firstfacedst +dst )

(3)

We defined the hazard rate that a district reopens for in-person instruction in t + 1 is a function of the baseline hazard
rate λ 0 (t ) , the same district characteristics in models (1)
and (2) and the first and second face power measures. In this
model, the COVID hospitalization rate and teachers’ union
first face power were measured on a weekly basis. A fair
number of districts (109 or 44%) were “left censored”
because they reopened at the first opportunity (at the onset of
risk), or Week 1 in our data set. Consequently, we excluded
these observations from the analysis and we performed the
survival analysis on the remaining 141 districts that did not
open at the onset of risk.
The key assumption of the Cox proportional hazard
model is the proportional hazards assumption. We checked
for proportional hazards by testing whether the log hazardratio function is constant over time for each covariate and
overall using STATA’s phtest command. We failed to reject
the null hypothesis of a zero slope (i.e., constant hazard
ratio) for all covariates, with the exception of charter schools
per 10,000, which we excluded from the Cox models.
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Table 3
Logistic Regression Models Predicting Probability of Remote and In-Person Instruction at the Beginning of Fall Semester
Remote

Remote

Remote

Remote

In person

In person

In person

In person

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Variable
District size (ln)

2.359**
(0.664)

CBA

0.424**
(0.119)
0.563
(0.292)

CBA length (in pages)

1.776
(0.922)
1.013**
(0.005)

Union revenue Q4
Union revenue Q3
Union revenue Q2
Union revenue Q1
First face power social media
posts (before school year)
Share of Trump votes in county
(partisanship)
New COVID hospitalizations
per 100,000 (weekly average)
% FRL students
% Black students
% Hispanic students
Charter schools per 10,000
students
Urban
Suburban
Total per pupil expenditures
(natural log)
N

0.942
(0.111)
0.923***
(0.020)
0.998
(0.004)
1.003
(0.009)
1.017
(0.017)
1.027†
(0.016)
1.181
(0.212)
1.227
(0.744)
1.167
(0.707)
1.203
(1.298)
244

0.989
(0.108)
0.911***
(0.019)
0.998
(0.004)
0.999
(0.009)
1.025
(0.017)
1.038*
(0.017)
1.235
(0.196)
3.247†
(2.192)
3.277†
(2.321)
0.547
(0.548)
244

0.995
(0.117)
0.944**
(0.020)
1.000
(0.004)
0.999
(0.009)
1.019
(0.019)
1.033*
(0.016)
1.450
(0.363)
1.573
(1.106)
2.283
(1.718)
0.948
(1.042)
181

0.987**
(0.004)
1.937
(0.959)
1.601
(0.969)
1.736
(1.080)
1.931
(1.183)
0.958
(0.111)
0.920***
(0.020)
1.006
(0.005)
0.994
(0.010)
1.038*
(0.019)
1.037*
(0.017)
1.365†
(0.239)
1.555
(1.184)
1.557
(1.247)
0.509
(0.545)
210

1.062
(0.125)
1.083***
(0.023)
1.002
(0.004)
0.997
(0.009)
0.984
(0.016)
0.974†
(0.015)
0.847
(0.152)
0.815
(0.494)
0.857
(0.519)
0.831
(0.897)
244

1.011
(0.111)
1.097***
(0.023)
1.002
(0.004)
1.001
(0.009)
0.975
(0.016)
0.963*
(0.016)
0.809
(0.129)
0.308†
(0.208)
0.305†
(0.216)
1.829
(1.832)
244

1.005
(0.118)
1.060**
(0.023)
1.000
(0.004)
1.001
(0.009)
0.981
(0.019)
0.968*
(0.015)
0.690
(0.173)
0.636
(0.447)
0.438
(0.329)
1.055
(1.159)
181

0.516
(0.256)
0.625
(0.378)
0.576
(0.358)
0.518
(0.317)
1.044
(0.121)
1.087***
(0.023)
0.994
(0.005)
1.006
(0.010)
0.963*
(0.017)
0.964*
(0.016)
0.733†
(0.129)
0.643
(0.489)
0.642
(0.514)
1.963
(2.100)
210

Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. CBA = collective bargaining agreement; FRL = free and reducedprice lunch.
†
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Results
Open Beginning of Fall Semester
We present the results from Equation (1), a series of
logistic regression models predicting the probability of
opening the fall semester with remote instruction (columns
1–4) and in-person instruction (columns 5–8) for each measure of second face union power in Table 3. The coefficients
are presented as odds ratios.
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As shown in column (1) of Table 3, we found that a one
log unit increase in school district size was associated with a
136% increase in the probability of opening the school year
in remote instruction (p < .01). Column (5) of Table 3 shows
that a 1% increase in school district size was associated with
a 58% decrease in the probability of opening the school year
in in-person instruction. We further found that for school
districts that have a CBA, each one page increase in the
length of the CBA was associated with a 13% increase in the
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probability of opening the school year in remote instruction
(column [3], p < .01), and a 13% decrease in the probability
of opening the school year in in-person instruction (column
[7], p < .01). We did not find a statistically significant relationship between having a CBA and the probability of starting the year in remote/in-person instruction, nor did we find
a statistically significant relationship between teachers’
union revenue or first face union power and the probability of
remote/in-person instructional decisions.4 Two other district
characteristics were predictive of remote/in-person instruction decisions at the start of fall semester—partisanship
and the percentage of Hispanic students. Columns (1) and
(2) show that a 1 percentage point increase in the percentage
of Trump voters in the county was associated with an 8%
decrease in the probability of remote instruction (p < .001)
(or an 8% increase in the probability of in-person instruction, p < .001). Furthermore, we found that a 1 percentage
point increase in Hispanic students was associated with a
2.7% increase in the probability of remote instruction and a
2.6% decrease in the probability of in-person instruction
(p < .10).
Ever Open During Fall Semester
We present the results from Equation (1) predicting the
probability of never opening and ever opening for in-person
instruction during the fall semester in Table 4. We found that
a one log unit increase in school district size was associated
with a 67% increase in the probability of never opening for
in-person instruction during fall semester (column (1), p <
.10) and a 40% decrease in the probability of ever opening
for in-person instruction (column (5), p < .10). Furthermore,
we found that a one-page increase in the length of a district’s
CBA was associated with a 0.07% increase in the probability
of never opening for in-person instruction (column (3), p <
.05), and a 0.06% decrease in the probability of ever opening
for in-person instruction. We found that districts with unions
in the top quintile of union revenue had a 380% higher likelihood of never opening for in-person instruction (column (4),
p < .10) and a 79% lower likelihood of ever opening for
in-person instruction (column (8), p < .10) than districts
with unions in the lowest quintile of union revenue. We did
not find that first face power significantly predicted the
probability of never opening and ever opening. We further
show in Table 4 that the percentage of Trump voters was
associated with a decrease in the likelihood of never
opening and an increase in the likelihood of ever opening.
Additionally, per pupil expenditures were associated with
an increased likelihood of never opening and an increased
likelihood of ever opening.
Number of Weeks Open During Fall Semester
Table 5 presents the results from Equation (2) predicting
the expected count of weeks in in-person learning during the

fall semester. The model coefficients should be interpreted
as incidence rate ratios (IRRs) that compare the occurrence
of the number of weeks of in-person instruction for a one
unit change in the independent variable. IRRs are obtained
by exponentiating the original coefficients (which reflect the
expected log number of weeks of remote instruction)
obtained from the Poisson regression model. IRR of 1.000
reflect that the rate of occurrence is equal between groups
being compared with the independent variable.
We show that a 1% increase in school district size was
associated with a 15% decrease in the expected count of
weeks of in-person instruction (column (1), p < .010).
Furthermore, we found that a one-page increase in the length
of the CBA was associated with a 1% decrease in the
expected count of weeks of in-person instruction (column
(3), p < .05). The other second face power and the first face
power measures were not statistically significant. We found
that a 1 percentage point increase in the Trump voters in a
county was associated with a 2% increase in the expected
count of weeks of in-person instruction (column (1), p < .001).
In some models, total per pupil expenditures was negatively
associated with the expected count of weeks of in-person
instruction.
Time to First Open Fall Semester
In Table 6, we show the Cox proportional hazard model
results from Equation (3), predicting the time to first open
during the fall semester. The model coefficients should be
interpreted as hazard ratios, or the change in the hazard of
experiencing a reopening for in-person instruction during
the fall semester for a one unit change in the independent
variable. We found that the first and second face power measures did not significantly predict the time to experiencing
in-person instruction during the fall semester. In fact, only
two characteristics were significantly related to the hazard of
experiencing in-person instruction—the percentage of
Trump voters in the county and per-pupil expenditures. A 1
percentage point increase in Trump voters was associated
with a 5% increase in the hazard of experiencing in-person
instruction (column (1), p < .05). A one log unit increase in
total per pupil expenditures was associated with an 82%
decrease in the hazard of experiencing in-person instruction
(column (1), p < .001).
Conclusion
This article is one of the first to explain variation in school
district reopening decisions throughout the duration of fall
2020 semester. Leveraging information on weekly school
reopening decisions over time, we show that, in a sample of
250 of the largest school districts, teachers’ unions’ second
face power (as measured by the size of the school district
and the length of a school districts’ CBA) was associated
with a lower probability of reopening for in-person
11

Table 4
Logistic Regression Models Predicting Probability of Never Opening and Ever Opening for In-Person Instruction During Fall Semester
Never open Never open Never open Never open
Variable
District size (ln)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(7)

(8)

0.994*
(0.003)

0.943
(0.096)
0.925***
(0.017)
1.000
(0.002)

1.005
(0.107)
0.919***
(0.017)
1.001
(0.002)

1.067
(0.121)
0.934**
(0.020)
1.001
(0.002)

1.534
(1.436)
2.058
(2.006)
3.045
(2.230)
4.795†
(4.325)
0.968
(0.108)
0.918***
(0.020)
1.001
(0.002)

1.004
(0.010)
0.990
(0.014)
1.004
(0.014)
1.058
(0.248)
1.733
(1.959)
0.932
(1.017)
11.076**
(8.330)
244

1.002
(0.009)
0.999
(0.014)
1.011
(0.014)
1.121
(0.255)
3.397
(3.603)
2.002
(2.005)
4.668†
(3.674)
244

0.999
(0.009)
0.994
(0.017)
1.019
(0.013)
1.024
(0.339)
2.198
(2.392)
1.156
(1.141)
6.903*
(5.970)
181

0.998
(0.009)
0.994
(0.012)
1.005
(0.015)
1.038
(0.268)
1.778
(1.853)
0.739
(0.781)
2.664
(2.134)
210

Union revenue Q1

Total per pupil expenditures
(natural log)
N

(6)

1.007*
(0.003)

Union Revenue Q2

Suburban

(5)

0.648
(0.462)

Union revenue Q3

Charter schools per 10,000
students
Urban

Ever open

1.542
(1.098)

Union revenue Q4

% Hispanic students

Ever open

0.601
(0.166)

CBA length (in pages)

% Black students

Ever open

†

1.665
(0.459)

CBA

First face power social media
posts (during fall)
Share of Trump votes in
county (partisanship)
New COVID hospitalizations
per 100,000 (weekly
average, max)
% FRL students

(4)

†

Ever open

1.061
(0.108)
1.081***
(0.020)
1.000
(0.002)

0.995
(0.106)
1.088***
(0.021)
0.999
(0.002)

0.937
(0.106)
1.071**
(0.023)
0.999
(0.002)

0.652
(0.610)
0.486
(0.474)
0.328
(0.240)
0.209†
(0.188)
1.033
(0.116)
1.090***
(0.024)
0.999
(0.002)

0.996
(0.010)
1.010
(0.014)
0.996
(0.014)
0.945
(0.221)
0.577
(0.652)
1.073
(1.172)
0.090**
(0.068)
244

0.998
(0.009)
1.001
(0.014)
0.989
(0.013)
0.892
(0.203)
0.294
(0.312)
0.499
(0.500)
0.214†
(0.169)
244

1.001
(0.009)
1.006
(0.017)
0.981
(0.012)
0.977
(0.324)
0.455
(0.495)
0.865
(0.854)
0.145*
(0.125)
181

1.002
(0.009)
1.006
(0.013)
0.995
(0.015)
0.963
(0.248)
0.562
(0.586)
1.354
(1.432)
0.375
(0.301)
210

Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. CBA = collective bargaining agreement; FRL = free and reducedprice lunch.
†
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

instruction at the beginning of the fall semester and
with ever opening for in-person instruction during fall.
Additionally, we found that larger school districts and school
districts with longer CBAs spent fewer weeks in in-person
instruction during fall. We did not find that measures of first
face power were related to the probability of in-person
instruction at the beginning or during fall semester. We
further found that politics, demographics, and per pupil
expenditures but not COVID-19 hospitalization rates
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were significantly associated with a return to in-person
instruction.
These findings match a growing body of literature that
decisions regarding whether to reopen schools were not
directly associated with the severity of the pandemic
(DeAngelis & Makridis, 2021; Grossmann et al., 2021;
Hartney & Finger, 2021). If policy was not being set wholly
based on the prevalence of COVID-19, then what might
decision makers be responding to when determining whether

Table 5
Poisson Regression Models Predicting Count of Weeks Open During Fall Semester
Variable
District size (ln)
CBA
CBA Length (in pages)
Union revenue Q4
Union revenue Q3
Union revenue Q2
Union revenue Q1
First face power social media posts
(during fall)
Share of Trump votes in county
(partisanship)
New COVID hospitalizations per
100,000 (weekly average, max)
% FRL students
% Black students
% Hispanic students
Charter schools per 10,000 students
Urban
Suburban
Total per pupil expenditures
(natural log)
N

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

†

0.847 (0.074)
1.023 (0.163)
0.996* (0.002)

1.010 (0.034)

0.990 (0.038)

1.004 (0.042)

1.036 (0.159)
0.916 (0.179)
0.855 (0.139)
0.792 (0.227)
1.003 (0.037)

1.022*** (0.005)

1.022*** (0.006)

1.018** (0.006)

1.024*** (0.007)

1.000 (0.001)

1.000 (0.001)

1.000 (0.001)

0.999 (0.001)

0.997 (0.003)
1.000 (0.004)
0.996 (0.005)
1.019 (0.062)
1.014 (0.150)
1.130 (0.159)
0.571** (0.124)

0.998 (0.003)
0.997 (0.005)
0.994 (0.005)
1.002 (0.061)
0.891 (0.118)
0.965 (0.124)
0.665† (0.153)

1.000 (0.003)
0.999 (0.006)
0.990* (0.005)
1.003 (0.091)
0.916 (0.153)
1.015 (0.171)
0.652 (0.184)

0.999 (0.003)
0.996 (0.005)
0.995 (0.006)
1.004 (0.065)
0.930 (0.149)
1.030 (0.170)
0.712 (0.196)

244

244

181

210

Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are presented as incidence rate ratios. CBA = collective bargaining agreement; FRL = free and
reduced-price lunch.
†
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

or not to reopen schools? Our article suggests that districts in
counties with a larger share of Trump voters were far more
likely to experience in-person instruction during the fall
semester. In short, partisan politics were intertwined with the
decisions about whether and how to reopen schools.
Grossmann et al. (2021) noted that “. . . limited and voluntary state guidance in the fall also meant that political conflict moved to the district level” (p. 644). Managing this
conflict primarily fell on school boards. While school board
candidates are often elected on a nonpartisan basis, their
constituencies certainly have political preferences, and substantial anecdotal evidence indicates that community members made their wishes known at school board meetings
(e.g., Heymann, 2021). Additionally, prior research suggests
substantial partisan differences in judgments regarding the
amount of health risk associated with contracting COVID19 and the best way manage the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g.,
Allcott et al., 2020). These same partisan judgments likely
informed school reopening policies.
We also show that schools were less likely to open for inperson instruction at the start of the school year in districts
with a larger share of Hispanic students. Some evidence
exists that Black and Hispanic parents were more likely than
White parents to express concern about the reopening of

schools and that this concern is likely grounded in the disproportional impact of the pandemic on Black and Hispanic
communities (Walsh, 2021). The hesitancy, then of school
districts in these communities, to return to in-person instruction could be in response to parents’ preference for remote
schooling options.
Beyond partisanship and demographics, we also show
that reopening decisions were associated with the second
face power of teachers’ unions but not the first face of power.
Our findings suggest that teachers’ concern about in-person
schooling as voiced through their unions likely played a role
in shaping instructional decisions during the fall 2020
semester. The second face of power is proactive power that
is established well in advance of the actual policy decision
and relies on the entrenched relationships between union
leadership and policy decision makers. Our findings are suggestive of the idea that in times of uncertainty, preestablished
relationship with policy allies are important for unions in
their advocacy on behalf of their membership. We found that
forceful and reactive responses, as captured by first face
power social media posts like lawsuits, protests, public statements, and information campaigns, were not related to
reopening decisions. These strong reactions from unions are
most often what is portrayed in popular media accounts as
13

Table 6
Cox Proportional Hazard Models Predicting Hazard of Opening for In-Person Instruction During Fall Semester
Variable

(1)

District size (ln)
CBA
CBA length (in pages)
Union revenue Q4
Union revenue Q3
Union revenue Q2
Union revenue Q1
First face power social media
posts
Share of Trump votes in county
(partisanship)
New COVID hospitalizations per
100,000 (weekly average, max)
% FRL students
% Black students
% Hispanic students
Urban
Suburban
Total per pupil expenditures
(natural log)
N

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.161 (0.244)
0.773 (0.404)
0.999 (0.002)

0.991 (0.258)

1.035 (0.288)

1.331† (0.203)

1.474 (0.756)
1.111 (0.671)
1.145 (0.609)
0.968 (0.726)
1.128 (0.255)

1.049** (0.016)

1.047*** (0.014)

1.030* (0.014)

1.044** (0.014)

0.998 (0.003)

0.998 (0.003)

0.994 (0.004)

0.999 (0.003)

0.994 (0.006)
1.013† (0.008)
1.006 (0.011)
1.255 (0.789)
2.445 (1.416)
0.183*** (0.094)

0.994 (0.006)
1.014† (0.008)
1.008 (0.013)
1.347 (0.860)
2.663 (1.656)
0.203* (0.156)

0.996 (0.007)
1.014 (0.011)
0.993 (0.010)
1.101 (0.729)
2.452† (1.319)
0.075** (0.062)

0.994 (0.006)
1.013† (0.008)
1.007 (0.012)
1.212 (0.871)
2.862 (2.032)
0.177* (0.129)

1,495

1,495

1,133

1,389

Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are presented as hazard ratios. CBA = collective bargaining agreement; FRL = free and reducedprice lunch.
†
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

evidence of teachers’ unions obstructing reopening decisions—but if anything, these are likely late efforts, and are
unsuccessful efforts to prevent planned policy decisions.
Altogether our paper adds to a body of literature that suggests teachers’ unions’ policy positions are associated with
eventual policy outcomes (e.g., Finger, 2019; Marianno,
2020)—this time in local-level school reopening decisions
during a worldwide pandemic. Additionally, we provide
some evidence of the correlates of school district decision
making during emergency situations where there is substantial uncertainty and limited evidence on the best path to pursue. In these situations, school districts might be more likely
to rely on the voiced preferences of their interest groups, the
political leanings of the electorate as articulated through
board members and board meetings, and the stated preferences of their largest demographic groups.
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Notes
1. Online Supplemental Appendix Table 1 shows that partisanship is correlated with the first and second face union power measures at between −0.333 and −0.082. There may be some concern
that partisanship is endogenous with the union power measures.
For example, a more favorable political environment enables
unions to exert more power. We follow prior research and retain
the measure in the model, but present results without partisanship
included in the online Supplemental Appendix Tables 2 through 5
and find similar results.
2. In a series of alternative models presented in the online
Supplemental Appendix Tables 6 through 9, we substituted the
COVID-19 hospitalization rate for the COVID-19 case rate and
found similar results.
3. It could also be possible that the levels of first face power
vary depending on the levels of second face power. As already
mentioned, unions that employ more first face power may do so
because they lack levels of second face power. We test this directly
by interacting first and second face power in all models. These
results are shown in the online Supplemental Appendix Tables 10
and 11. We find little evidence of an interaction effect between the
first and second faces of power.
4. It could be the case that union first face power responds to
the implementation of reopening decisions instead of the planned
implementation of reopening decisions. In other words, first face

Teachers’ Unions and COVID-19
power may increase after the start of the school year. In a revised
model (shown in the online Supplemental Appendix Table 12,
Panel A), we substitute our traditional measure, which scores
the number of first face power posts in the four weeks before the
school year for a new measure that scores the number of posts in
the four weeks after the school year commences. We found that a
one unit increase in future first face power was associated with
a higher likelihood of starting the school year in-person (column
2) but this effect was not statistically significant. Panel B of the
online Supplemental Appendix Table 12 shows the results from the
Cox proportional hazards model predicting time to first open. In
this model, we substituted the contemporaneous measure of first
face power (measured in the week in which a reopening decision is
being implemented) to the week after, 2 weeks after, 3 weeks after,
and 4 weeks after a reopening decision was being implemented.
In all cases, the hazard rate was positive (a unit increase in future
first face power was associated with an increase in the hazard of
experience reopening); only when future first face power measured
the week after reopening implementation is that hazard rate statistically significant and only at p < .10. We interpret these results
as evidence that first face power did not occur in response to the
implementation of reopening decisions.
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